The Partial Performance Interest of the Defaulting Employee - Part Two by Corman, Calvin W.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 38
Issue 3 Winter 1954-1955 Article 2
The Partial Performance Interest of the Defaulting
Employee - Part Two
Calvin W. Corman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Calvin W. Corman, The Partial Performance Interest of the Defaulting Employee - Part Two, 38 Marq. L. Rev. 139 (1955).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol38/iss3/2
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Vol. 38 WINTER, 1954-55 No. 3
THE PARTIAL
PERFORMANCE INTEREST OF THE
DEFAULTING EMPLOYEE-PART TWO
CALVIN W. CORMAN
THE VOIDABLE CONTRACT
Consideration has thus far been given to the effect of the employee's
abandonment after part performance of a valid contract.' When the
contract is voidable at the employee's election, as in the employment of
a minor, or at the election of either party, such as contracts within the
terms of the Statute of Frauds, the sanctity of the legal promise should
become less important as a reason for barring relief when weighed in
comparison with the judicial desire to restore unjust enrichment. The
infant's contract is also protected by the desire of the judiciary to
defend such employee from his own immaturity. What then of the legal
development of the voidable employment contract?
WHERE AN INFANT EmPLOYEE ABANDONS EMPLOYMENT
The early English cases clearly did not distinguish between default
by the infant and adult. Neither was allowed to recover for part per-
formance. Relief was denied in 16882; and Lord Mansfield commented
in deciding Drury v. Drury- that "if an infant pays money with his
own hand without a valuable consideration he cannot get it back again."
The famous case of Holmes v. Blogg' involved an action for money
had and received by an infant who avoided an agreement to lease the
defendant'i house. Justice Gibbs said that the infant might avoid the
lease and covenants and escape the burden of rent, but this is all that
he could do. "He cannot by putting an end to the lease recover back
any consideration he has paid for it."
The earliest reported case in the United States involving a minor
I See Corman, The Partial Performance Interest of the Defaulting Employee-
Part One, 38 MA.Q. L. REv. 61 '(1954).
2 Kirton v. Elliott, 2 Bulst. 69, 80 Eng. Rep. 996 (1688).
3 Drury v. Drury, 2 Eden 39 (obiter dicta by Lord Mansfield).
4 Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 508. Holmes, an infant, with his partner, Taylor,
had agreed with the defendant to take a lease on his house. Part of the money
was paid on the contract by Holmes while still an infant. When he came of
age he disaffirmed the lease on the basis of his infancy and sued to recover
the money paid by him on the ground of failure of consideration. Held that
he could not recover.
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who disaffirmed an employment contract after part performance and
sued to recover the value of completed service arose in Massachusetts
in 1824.5 Recovery was allowed to the infant on the ground that the
contract had been avoided, and an indebitatus assumpsit action upon
a quantum meruit lies "as it would if no contract had been made." The
Court, however, placed restriction upon the recovery, to the extent of
allowing the jury to make allowance for any disappointment amounting
to an injury which the defendant in such case would sustain by the
avoiding of the contract. The relief therefore is indentical with that
granted to the defaulting adult employee ten years later in Britton v.
Turner. The employer's right to damage set-off, however, did not long
prevail and had been overruled in Massachusetts by 1837.6
Judge Savage sat upon the New York appellate court bench during
the 1820's, and it fell to him to decide the course that New York would
take in employment default cases both as to adult and infant employees.
The adult employee in Lantry v. Parks7 had worked ten and one half
months of his contract for one year, but this did not influence Savage,
who denied all relief. Neither could Savage preceive a distinction so
far as right to compensation for work performed was concerned be-
tween the defaulting infant and adult. Thus, in the same year, he also
denied the claim of the infant in McCoy v. Huffman." This judgment
rests upon Lord Mansfield's obiter dicta and Holmes v. Blogg. The
Lantry case influenced the trend of future cases throughout the United
States; however, McCoy v. Huffiman lasted less than twenty years
within New YorkY During this time it swayed only two opinions from
other states, one from New Hampshire and the other from Indiana.
Weeks v. Leighton from New Hampshire in 1831 at least recognized
the existing split of authority in this country by acknowledging the
existence of Mosses v. Stevens. The Mosses case from Massachusetts
had been decided adversely to Savage's McCoy decision three years
before that opinion. It was not cited, however, by Justice Savage. The
influence of Savage and the English decision of Holmes v. Blogg is
observed in the New Hampshire court's comment that "to enable him
5 Mosses v. Stevens, 2 Pick. 332 (Mass. 1824).6 Vent v. Osgood, 19 Pick. 572 (Mass. 1837) ; see also Whitemarsh v. Hall, 3
Denio 373 (N.Y. 1846), refusing to adopt the off-set damage rule in New York.7Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen 63 (N.Y. 1827).
8 8 Cowen 83 (N.Y. 1827).
9 Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill 110 (N.Y. 1845). Justice Beardsley expressed the
belief that Savage was wrong in relying on Holmes v. Blogg as authority for
denying recovery in the McCoy v. Hoffman decision. The infant in the Holmes
case had received equivalent benefit for the money paid, justifying denial to
him of recovery; while in both the McCoy case and the Medbury decision, the
infant had received no benefit prior to his disaffirmance of the contract.
The footnote annotation following the Mosses v. Stevens decision in com-
menting on Holmes v. Blogg says, "it has been so limited and explained that
it would no longer be regarded in the court where is was decided as an author-
ity for the position taken in Weeks v. Leighton and McCoy v. Hoffman."
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to recover for what he may have done under the contract he abandons,
is to permit him, not merely to avoid his contract but to change it into
a different contract at his own election without the consent of the
other party.10 This is not reasonable, and would be in many cases to
put a sword instead of a shield into his hand."11 Weeks v. Leighton
lasted in New Hampshire until only 1852, when it was overruled 22
The Indiana decision in 1837 was based upon the Court's view that
to allow the infant to recover for his part performance would "enable
him to practice upon others the fraud and imposition against which his
privilege of infancy was designed to protect himself." 1852, the year
that the New Hampshire opinion was overruled in that state, was also
the year that the Indiana Supreme Court upset the earlier view and
allowed recovery to the infant disaffirming his contract on the basis of
defective capacity.1 3
These three decisions from New York, New Hampshire and
Indiana, having been overruled, the issue became settled. The infant
employee could quit his employment without justifiable cause and,
relying upon his right to disaffirm the agreement, recover the value of
the service performed up to the date of abandonment.1 4 This became
a universal rule throughout the United States. Protection of the infant
and prevention of unjust enrichment were felt to be of greater im-
portance than protection of the contract promise by imposition of a
10 Compare with Mosses v. Stevens, supra note 5: "... recovery upon quantum
meruit lies as if no contract had been made."
1 Compare with Vent v. Osgood, supra note 6: "Should the adult keep the ship
or the farm and the money advanced? We do not think that such is the law.
If it were so, instead of covering him with a shield it would put him to the
sword."
'
2 Lufkin v. Mayall, 25 N.H. 82 (1852).
13 Dallas v. Hollingsworth, 3 Ind. 537 (1852), see also Wheatley v. Miscal, 5 Ind.
143 (1854).
14 INDIANA: Supra note 13.
IOWA: Byerlee v. Mendel, 39 Iowa 382 (1874) (Employer allowed damage off-
set).
MAINE: Judkins v. Walker, 17 Me. 38 (1840); Deroche v. Continental Mills,
58 Me. 217 (1870).
MASSACHUSETTS: Mosses v. Stevens, 2 Pick 332 (1824) ; Vent v. Osgood, 19
Pick 572 (1837).
NEw YORK: Medbury v. Watrous, 7 Hill 110 (N.Y. 1845); Whitemarsh v.
Hall, 3 Denio 373 (N.Y. 1846).
NEBRASKA: 25 Neb. 270, 41 N.W. 145 (1888).
NEw HAMPSHIRE: Lufkin v. Mayall, 25 N.H. 82 (1852).
NOTE: It should be noted that the issue under consideration involves dis-
affirmance by the infant when part of the contract is still executory. When the
disaffirmance comes after the contract is completely executed there is a split of
authority depending in some jurisdictions upon whether the infant can return
the adult to status quo. Recovery was denied to the infant in the following
cases unless he could restore the status quo: Middleton v. Hoge, 5 Bush. 478
(Ky. 1869) ; Bryant v. Pottinger, 6 Bush. 473 (Ky. 1869); Welsh v. Welsh 103
Mass. 562 (1870) ; Heath v. Stevens, 48 N.H. 251 (1869); Locke v. Smith, 41
N.H. 346 (1860); Breed v. Judd, 1 Gray 455 (Mass. 1854) ; Contra: Price v.
Furman, 27 Vt. 268 (1855) ; Kitchen v. Lee, 7 Paige 107; Boody v. McKinney,
23 Me. 517 (1844); Bartlett v. Drake, 100 Mass. 174 (1868).
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penalty. This is certainly a sounder approach than the early English
view that a total forfeiture of part performance should be imposed.
When the infant is close to adulthood at the time he contracts, there
has been suggestion that some distinction should be drawn. This dis-
tinction might possibly take the form of applying the Britton v. Turner
rule. Only restitution of unjust enrichment would be recoverable.
Damages resulting to the adult employer as a result of the infant's
abandonment would be allowed as recoupment. The eighteen year old
minor would lose some of his common law protection, but a forfeiture
would not be imposed. This is in conformity with the legislative view
of some of the Western states that require the eighteen year old to
return the goods or value received, when he desires to disaffirm an
executed contract. A distinction based iupon age may, therefore, also
be justified in the executory default case.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Two sections of the Statute of Frauds are often found in employ-
ment breach cases: section four, relating to real estate transactions,
and section five involving the agreement not to be performed within
one year.
CONTRACTS NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR
This type of employment default situation was first adjudicated in
the Northeastern states of New York, Vermont and Connecticut, all
before the middle of the nineteenth century. The New York court
allowed recovery for part performance but exercised the joint grounds
of void contract under the Statute of Frauds and possibility of mutual
termination of agreement by the parties.15 The Vermont opinion denied
relief on the basis of a forfeiture clause within the oral contract.16 The
effect is to give the contract partial recognition. The stipulation within
the unenforceable agreement is legally recognized as a defense. Limited
recognition of the unenforceable contract is also to be found when the
courts that grant quasi-contract recovery limit the amount thereof to
the contract price.17 The reason given for the latter approach is that the
defaulting promisor should not be allowed to recover more for the work
performed than he could have recovered if he had completed his agree-
ment. Minnesota has also recognized the forfeiture stipulation within
oral contracts in order to deny recovery to the defaulter.' This also
gives limited recognition in order to restrict recovery. When certain
provisions are given full recognition and the balance of the agreement
's Shute v. Dorr, 5 Wend. 204 (N.Y. 1830) Note, the fact that the employee was
an infant was not considered.
16 Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383 (1834).
17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §538 approves such recognition. See also RESTATE-
MENT, CoNmrRACrs §537; Clark v. Terry, 25 Conn. 395 (1856).
I8 Kriger v. Lepel, 42 Minn. 6, 43 N.W. 484 (1889) (Voidable rather than void).
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is disregarded, it becomes clear that the court does not consider the
agreement "void" in the true sense.
Connecticut serves as an example on the shifting attitude of the
courts on the problem and also of the use of limited recognition of the
voidable contract. In the 1840's, the Connecticut court refused to
presume an intention of forfeiture by the contracting parties when none
was expressed, and therefore allowed a recovery for the completed
performance ;19 however, by the 1850's this attitude was restricted to the
employee who brought his action after the due date for payment of the
debt as provided in the contract.20 Once again, the contract, although
recognized as falling within the one year performance provision of the
Statute of Frauds, was given limited recognition in order to defeat the
employee's claim for restitution.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, decisions from
Illinois21 and New York22 denied recovery to the employee, but before
the turn of the twentieth century both decisions had been reversed 23
When the oral employment agreement could not be performed within
one year, the employee not only had the right to terminate the contract
with the Statute of Frauds to justify his action, but the work performed
before the date of termination created an enrichment of the employer
that must be returned to the employee. The valid written contract in-
volved the factor of breach of promise; a distinction could therefore be
drawn between degrees of breach causation. However, regardless of
the moral issue of standing by a given promise, no legal obligation
existed when the promise was oral. If recovery of the restitution
interest was to be judicially denied, the courts would have to afford
greater importance to the possible option of employee performance than
to employer enrichment. Only the executory and not the executed part
of the oral agreement would fall within the protection of the Statute of
Frauds. The decision of the court therefore became a balancing of
interests, primarily a question of importance to be given to the "one
year performance" provision of the Statute of Frauds.
There have been few cases during the twentieth century disallowing
recovery to the plaintiff for part performance of the service contract
that could not be performed within one year ;24 while in contrast a num-
19 Comes v. Lanson, 16 Conn. 246 (1844).
20 Clark v. Terry, 25 Conn. 395 (1856).
21 Swanzey v. Moore, 22 Ill. 63, 74 Am.Dec. 134 (1859).
22 Galvin v. Prentice, 45 N.Y. 162, 6 Am. Rep. 58 (1871).
23 Overruled in Illinois by Collins v. Thayer, 74 Ill. 138 (1874) ; in New York by
Hartwell v. Young, 67 Hun. 472, 22 N.Y.S. 486 (1893) (Points out that the
holding on the present issue in Galvin v. Prentice was merely oblter dicta and24 "can scarcely be regarded as an authority upon the question raised here").
Recovery was denied in Perlberg v. Geminder, 89 A2d 448 (N.J. Super. 1952);
but the reason was that the plaintiff failed to prove the value of his services
and the New Jersey statute R.S. 25; 1-5 (e) N.J.S.A. classifies the contract as
"void".
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ber of opinions have recognized the employee's restitution interest,
primarily during the latter part of the nineteenth century.25
ENGLISH DECISIONS
Halsbury's Laws of England states that where work is done at the
request of the defendant, from which he has benefited, the plaintiff
can recover on a quantum meruit notwithstanding that the respective
contracts were within the Statute.28 Professor Williams, however, rely-
ing upon the early English cases of Thomas v. Brown17 and Jones v.
Jones,28 proposes that when the contract has been partly executed by
one party, that party cannot subsequently claim, purely on the ground
that the contract does not comply with the Statute, the right to undo
what he has already done. "If money be paid, or the property in goods
or land has passed or a security has been given, these matters can be
supported by the defendant by reference to the unenforceable con-
tract."25 While seeming at first to be contradictory, these views are
reconcilable when one notes that Williams limits his statement to money
paid or property in goods or land. The employment service contract is
not specifically considered. Similar attention has been accorded the
problem by Corbin in his recent treatise on Contracts where he states
in his text that "the courts in most such cases allow the defendant to
set up the oral contract in defense" 30 (emphasis added), but qualifies
the statement in the footnote discussing specifically the service contract
with the comment that "in this class of cases most courts allow a re-
covery.
2
131
25 DELAWARE: Mary McGarland v. Steward & Clark, 2 Hous. 277 (Del. 1860).
GEORGIA: Bentley v. Smith, 3 Ga. App. 242, 59 S.E. 720 (1907).
INDIANA: Tague v. Hayward, 25 Ind. 427 (1865) "To allow the defendant to
avail himself of it as defense would be to enforce it in his favor, while the
same right is denied to the other party, thus defeating the very object of the
statute." (Emphasis added.)
MAINE: Bernier v. Cabot Mfg. Co., 71 Me. 506, 36 Am. Rep. 343 (1880).
MASSACHUSEcrs: Hill v. Hooper, 1 Gray 133 (Mass. 1854) (No opinion expres-
sed) ; King v. Welcome, 5 Gray 41 (Mass. 1855) (See discussion of case in
KEENER ON QUASI CONTRAcrs 234-8 and WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CON-
TRACTS sec. 98.; Freeman v. Foss, 145 Mass. 361, 14 N.E. 141, 1 Am. St. Rep.
467 (1887).
NEW YORK: McGlucky v. Bitter. 1 E. D. Smith 618 (N.Y. 1852); Hartwell v.
Young, 67 Hun. 472. 22 N.Y.S. 486 (1893), overruling earlier N.Y. decision of
Galvin v. Prentice, 45 N.Y. 162 (1871).
WISCONSIN: Salb v. Campbell, 65 Wis. 405 (1886) (The parties stand in the
same relation to each other as though no express contract existed between
them) ; Draheim v. Evison 112 Wis. 27 (1901). See discussion of case by
Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Constitutes An Un-juest Retention, 48 MICH. L. REv. 923, 939-40; Chase v. Hinckley, 126 Wis. 75,
105 N.W. 230 (1905); Estate of Hippe, 200 Wis. 373 (1930).
26 7 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, see. 189, p. 133.2 7 Thomas v. Brown [1876] 1 Q.B.D. 714, 723.2s Jones v. Jones [1840] 6 M. & W. 84; 151 E.R. 331.
29 Williams, Availability By Way of Defence of Contracts Not Complying With
the Statute of Frauds, 50 LAW Q. Rzv. 532, 534 (1934).
30 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACrS, sec. 332, pp. 177-178.
31 Supra note 30, p. 178, note 70.
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In England, the employee's part performance interest under oral
agreements not performable within one year has not been squarely de-
cided by appellate judicial decision. 32 A recent service employment case
involved sickness of the employee rather than intentional abandonment
of performance. 33 Recovery was granted, but the allowance has been
criticized by Denning on the34 premise that the valid contract was still
subsisting and thereby precluded recovery under implied contract. If
the employee had resigned rather than fallen ill, it is evident that in
England, where the contract is valid, Denning's statement could not be
questioned. However, when the case rests within the Statute of Frauds
and either party elects to terminate performance relying upon the
Statute, the election constitutes a rescission of the express agreement;
therefore, use of the implied contract should no longer be precluded.
Criticism has been leveled at the English axiom that the implied con-
tract is precluded by the continued existence of the express agreement
as it creates an automatic forfeiture of the intentionally defaulting em-
ployee's executed performance. The criticism has even greater justifi-
cation when the promise is oral and comes within the "one year per-
formance" provision of the Statute of Frauds. The employee's promise
of performance creates at best a voidable obligation. A distinction
should be recognized between the valid and voidable obligation. The
equal denial of the employee's restitution interest in both situations does
not adequately express this difference.
LAw IN CANADA
Early litigation in Canada held that the employee did not possess
the right to sue his employer for wrongful *discharge when the contract
fell within the Statute of Frauds. Either party could justifiably termi-
nate the contract at any time.35 However, it was soon held that should
the employer exercise his prerogative, the employee could then recover
under the common counts for the value of the service performed.36
When the specific issue arose questioning whether the right would be
33 Savage v. Canning, 1 Ir.R.C.L. 434 (1867), involved completed Derformance of
a construction contract; Scarisbrick v. Parkinson [1869] 20 L.R. 175, 17 W.R.
-467, also involved comnleted performance of a service-employment contract;
Scott v. Pattison, [1923] 39 T.L.R. 557, 12 Digest 166, 1214a, 129 L.T.Rep. 830.
Here Justice Salter stated that "If the plaintiff can satisfy the court that he
has not been paid all that is fair and reasonable that he should receive in all
the circumstances, he will succeed." The employee's reason for failure of per-
formance, however, is sickness, rather than intentional abandonment of per-
formance. Even this approach however has been criticized by Denning, Quan-
t Meruit and The Statute of Frauds, 41 L. Q. REv. 79 (1925), on the
ground that the contract was still subsisting and unrescinded, and thus suit
could not be brought on implied contract while the express contract subsisted.
a3 Scott v. Pattison, supra note 32.
34Supra note 32.
35 Diskson v. Jacquest. 31 ILC.Q.B.R. 141 (1871).
36 Harper v. Davies, 45 U.C.9.B.R. 442 (1880) : "I do not see however, how he
could have withdrawn the plaintiff's claim upon the common counts from thejury".
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afforded when the election to use the Statute of Frauds was exercised
by the employee rather than the employer, the Ontario court refused
recovery stating that
"No English or Canadian case has, though counsel have searched
diligently, been found to authorize his recovering for his service
where he has abandoned his employment voluntarily under a
contract unenforceable under the statute. 37
The same distinction is thus drawn between discharge and abandon-
ment when the contract is unenforceable because of the Statute of
Frauds as when enforceable under a valid agreement.
SECTION FOUR OF THE STATUTE OF Firuis
The part performance interest of the defaulter in oral agreements
involving real estate is separately considered, since the courts have
been influenced in their decisions by the law of real property. The
typical situation involves an oral promise of care and support of the
aged real estate owner in exchange for conveyance of the realty at a
future date, often upon the owner's death. It has been established
from an early date, that the vendee of real estate who terminates his
oral contract to purchase real estate forfeits his down payment. The
distinction between "payment" for care and support by promise to
convey and "exchange" of real estate for money is slim. In both
situations real estate is exchanged for bargained value.
Courts which have not followed the precedent of Britton v. Turner
in valid contract cases have allowed recovery to the plaintiff under the
oral contract not performable within one year;3 however, the only
states that grant relief to the defaulter when section four of the Statute
of Frauds is involved are those offering recovery when the contract is
valid.39 Justice Parker, who wrote the Britton v. Turner decision for
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, also granted recovery to the de-
faulter on a land contract case falling within the Statute of Frauds ;40
Collins v. Smith; Campbell v. McWilliams [1908] 11 O.W.R. 350; Judge Doull
in a recent decision stated "The only time when the contract which is within
the statute can be admitted as a defense is when the plaintiff is seeking to re-
cover money or property which has passed in pursuance of the contract; e.g.,
if I am sued for the return of a deposit, I can justify my retaining it by show-
ing an oral agreement for the sale of land which the plaintiff refused to com-
plete." (Emphasis added). Coady v. Lewis & Sons [1951] 3 D.L.R. 845,848.
Note: the court uses the term "property" but limits his example to a money
deposit. Does his term include personal services in an employment contract?
38 See decisions from Massachusetts, New York and Wisconsin supra note 25.
39 Indiana: Humphrey v. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920) ; Miller
v. Kifer, 75 Ind. App. 198, 130 N.E. 278 (1921); Texas: Wanscaffe v. Pon-
tonjoa, 63 S.W. 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). In Scotten v. Brown, 4 Har. 324
(Del. 1845) complete performance of the contract was established.
40 Crawford v. Parsons, 18 N.H. 293 (1846). Parker: "There being no sufficient
consideration for the plaintiff's promise to labor for the term, he might stop at
his pleasure and is not obliged to invoke the aid of Britton v. Turner to enable
him to recover ...
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however, this decision has now been overruled, both in the nineteenth"1
and twentieth centuries.4
2
Where the partially performing party's promise is voidable at his
election,43 as in the case of the minor, relief is uniformly granted.
There is a tendency in the same direction when the oral employment
promise is for the performance of services that cannot be completed
within the year. The judicial reluctance is found in the attempt to ex-
tend relief to partial performance of the oral promise of services in ex-
change for real estate.
POSITION OF THE TEXT COMMENTATOR
Divided opinion regarding the right to recover for part performance
of the parol contract is discernible in text commentaries as well as in
judicial decisions. Browne, writing on Frauds,44 and Wood, on the Law
of Master and Servant,4 5 contend that recovery should be allowed;
while Keener, in his text on Quasi Contracts, in 1893, expressed strong
opposition to such view. Woodward, Williston and Corbin state that
recovery is generally not allowed; but Williston separates those states
that classify the Statute of Frauds cases as void rather than voidable,
and Corbin by footnote eliminates from his general statement the em-
ployment service contract. Mechem, in his work on Agency, contents
himself with the statement that whether recovery may be had is "not
entirely agreed upon by the authorities."4 The Restatement of Con-
tracts suggests that there be no recovery " . . . except to the extent
that such a right would exist if the requirements of the Statute were
satisfied and the contract an enforceable one." 47 Thus the employee
41 Clements v. Marston, 52 N.H. 31 (1872).
42 Southern v. Kittredge, 85 N.H. 307, 158 At. 132 (1932).
43 The infant's contract is uniformly classified today as voidable rather than void.
The same uniformity, however, is not to be found in contracts falling within
the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. It is generally, however, the states
that classify such contracts as voidable that refuse relief, thereby justifying a
consideration of Statute of Fraud cases under the general topic of voidable
promises.
44,The clear rule of law is that an oral contract within the Statute of Frauds
cannot be made the ground of a defense any more than of a demand; the
obligation of the plaintiff to perform it is no more available to the defendant
in the former case than the obligation of the defendant to -perform it would
be to the plaintiff in the latter case." BROWNE ON FRAUDs sec. 131 (4th ed.
1880).
45 . ... the fact that a person that has contracted to serve another one year, to
commence at a future date, enters upon the performance of his contract does
not take the case out of the statute, and the servant may quit at any time dur-
ing the term and recover the value of his services rendered upon a quantum
meruit without deduction for any loss to the employer. . . ." WooD ON
MASTER AND SERVANT 373.
46 1 MECHEm ON AGENCY §1579, p. 1181 (2nd ed. 1914).47 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS §217 (1) (b) and §355(4) ; "A and B enter into an
oral contract for the performance of services by A extending over a period
of two years. B promises to pay $5,000 for these services when they have been
rendered. After six months work A, without other justification than the
Statute, declines to proceed further and sues for the value of what he has
done. B requests that the contract be fully performed and- states that he will
1955]
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who relies solely upon the Statute of Frauds as the foundation for
ceasing performance forfeits his part performance equally with the
employee who breaches the valid enforceable agreement. The Restate-
ment justifies this joint classification with the comment that "the fact
that the contract is unenforceable by reason of the Statute does not put
the plaintiff in a worse position in this respect. ' 48 (Emphasis added.)
The issue is not whether it is worse but whether it should be better.
Should there be a distinction drawn between terminating a valid and a
voidable agreement? The Restatement .suggests that no distinction be
drawn when the employer is (1) ready and willing to perform or (2)
there is a refusal to sign a submitted memorandum.4 9 The written
memorandum, originally proposed by Woodward and adopted by the
Restatement, has merit in that it converts an unenforceable agreement
into a valid contract; but its use is not compulsory, and the alternative
suggested by the Restatement does not give the employee equal as-
surance. That the employer is desirous of continued performance at
the time the employee contemplates termination of the oral promise is
not assurance that the employer may not have a change of attitude as
the work progresses. The benefit of part performance is held by the
employer, and therefore the pressure for continued performance is
disproportionate.
Keener would deny all relief to the party terminating performance
on the voidable contract because to allow recovery "confers a right upon
the defaulter, notwithstanding his failure to perform the contract."50
and because
"It is a strange result to reach that a statute enacted to give a
defense, where but for the statute the party would be liable for
breach of contract not only gives a defense, but also confers
upon the party guilty of a breach of contract a right against the
party not in default. '51 (Emphasis added.)
No distinction is drawn by Keener between the intentional breach of
the enforceable contract and the termination of performance under an
unenforceable oral agreement. The Statute of Frauds is available for
use as a defense, but the party so using it becomes "guilty of breach
pay for the services when they have been rendered. A cannot recover." Ex-
ample 2, §217 (b). Note: The comment to §355 (4) expresses the view that
the non-defaulting party to the oral contract is not a wrongdoer, a point that
has never been questioned, but the issue is whether the plaintiff who terminates
his performance because the oral contract is subject to avoidance by the other
party at any time is a wrongdoer to the extent that he should forfeit his part
performance.
4s Comment on subsection 4 of §355 of RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS.
49The suggestion of the written memorandum orginally proposed by Woodward,
p. 156, sec. 98 was accepted as sound by Williston, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
sec. 538, p. 1565 (1936 ed.), and adopted by the RESTATEMENT (see supra note
47). See also 2 CORUIN ON CONTRACTS, sec. 332, p. 180. (1951).
o KEENER ON QUASI CONTRACTS p. 235 (1893).51Ibid. p. 236.
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of contract." The inconsistency stems from the strict view taken when
performance is promised and then not fulfilled.
Restoration of the value of part performance has also been denied
on the ground that the jurisdiction involved classifies the Statute of
Frauds agreement as "voidable" rather than "void." Being voidable, it
is in effect classified as valid until the right to disaffirm is exercised.
Executory performance is excused, but having been the one to exercise
the right to disaffirm, the employee cannot claim a return of executed
performance. It is in effect a "leave the parties where the court finds
them" attitude, once prevalant in cases involving illegal contracts and
agreements impossible of complete performance. The infant's contract
is also classified as "voidable"; and it is uniformly held that he is al-
lowed recovery for the reasonable value of part performance prior to
the time that he quits his employment. Voidability is therefore the basis
for denying recovery in one situation and allowing it in another. Al-
though voidability is often used as the ground for denying restitution
relief to the defaulter, this fact does not underlie the distinction. The
difference in approach is based on a distinction in social policy.
s2
The infant is given the opportunity to avoid his promise because of
the desire to afford protection against too great a discrepancy in bar-
gaining capacity. The infant needs protection from himself. This pro-
tection loses a great deal of its value when the infant's disaffirmance
only excuses executory performance. The protection must necessarily
extend to a restoration of the value the infant has already conferred.
The policy reason underlying the Statute of Frauds is not unilateral as
with the infant, but bilateral in that both contracting parties need the
same degree of protection. There is not any greater possibility of the
employee forgetting details of the agreement, or defrauding the em-
ployer because of the oral nature of the agreement, than there is of the
employer.53 Both parties as well as the community in general require
the certainty and definiteness of the written agreement. The protection
of the infant necessitates that he receive restitution for part perfor-
mance; but it has been argued that similar protection need not be
afforded to the adult who bases his agreement upon the oral promise.
The purpose of the right of avoidance must be kept in mind.
52 "Some of the decisions are based upon the idea that the statute should prevent
the indirect enforcement of a contract as well as its direct enforcement, and
should be usable in defense as well as in attack This may be partly a matter
of statutory interpretation, but it is more largely a matter of opinion as to
social policy." 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACrS sec. 334, p. 183.
53 Not only does the transaction involving real estate involve descriptive details
of the property involved, but especially during early use of the Statute of
Frauds the value of real estate involved in contracts was usually greater than
in personal property. The importance of the value involved can be seen in the
requirement that a contract for the sale of personal property over $500 must
be in writing. (Originally 501 and now reduced in some states to as low as$50.)
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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the sole purpose
of the Statute of Frauds was to prevent fraud and deceit. The de-
fendant thus could not admit the existence of the oral contract and at
the same time set it up as a defense to the action to recover the down
payment; he was required to deny that the alleged oral promise was
ever made or that the fraud ran to a particular portion of the agree-
ment.54 Today this attitude has changed and the Statute of Frauds
serves as a defense when there is no allegation of fraud or deceit. It is
of more importance that the plaintiff complete his oral promise than
that the defendant allege that the oral promise involves fraud or deceit.55
The disadvantage of the present day attitude towards the Statute
of Frauds is that the same pressure for continued performance by the
employee, found in the enforceable written contract, also exists in the
oral agreement; but there is not the same assurance that the employer
will continue to recognize the oral agreement. If the employer should
decide to avoid the oral agreement (a written memorandum not being
involved), the plaintiff will still not recover the reasonable value of his
completed performance because there will still be no compensation for
the losses and expenditures that he has suffered in performance that do
not result in pecuniary benefit to the defendant. Although continued
performance with the right to restitution when the employer avoids the
oral agreement is better than forfeiture if the employee should decide
to exercise the option, it leaves him at a considerable disadvantage in
comparison with the position of the employer who does not extend
credit.
Finally, the proposal of the Restatement that the same standards be
used for the defaulter under the Statute of Frauds as in the enforceable
written contract makes "wilfulness" of the default the controlling
factor. When an employee working under an oral agreement terminates
his employment relying upon the Statute of Frauds "as his only justifi-
cation for failure to complete performance,"58 is his breach as "wilful"
as the intentional defaulter on the written contract who does not have
the Statute of Frauds to vindicate his abandoning performance? The
Restatement draws no distinction between the two defaulters when the
defendant has not "refused to perform.15 7 Complete protection is
presently given the infant, and in most jurisdictions to the service con-
tract employee when the contract cannot be performed within one year.
In Canada, recovery under the latter circumstance is refused, and there
may still be some doubt upon this question in England. When, how-
54 It is typical, however, for the alleged fraud to run to a particular term or por-
tion of the oral agreement. To admit the existence of the oral agreement
should not prevent the defendant from setting up the fraud as to the indi-
vidual particular within the contract.
5 See 2 CoiBiN ON CoNTRAcTs sec. 332, pp. 179-80.
56 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTAcTs §217 (1) (b).57 Ibid.
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ever, the oral contract falls within section four of the Statute of Frauds,
compensation for the partly performed services (care and support for
the aged real property owner) is today uniformly denied in the United
States, except in the several states that adhere strictly to the Britton v.
Turner rule. A written memorandum has been suggested by text
writers and adopted by the Restatement of Contracts as a method of
lightening the continued performance pressure placed upon both parties
to the oral agreement. The Restatement, however, does not distinguish
between sections four and five of the Statute of Fraudss and reverts
to the "wilful" test used in determining the right to restitution in valid
contracts-a test which has been consistently criticized by writers and
used by the courts only to supplement proper evaluation of the truly
conflicting issues.
DIVISIBILITY OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
During the 1820's, the general rule was established in New York
and Massachusetts to the effect that termination of an entire term
service contract precluded any recovery for the completed performance.
A decade later the modification of Britton v. Turner was proposed but
the "forfeiture rule" was too strongly established. The writers and
commentators were more impressed with the apparent equities of the
decision than were the courts in subsequent eighteenth century liti-
gation relating to employment contracts.
During this same period the argument for pro rata recovery on the
basis of divisibility of contract was launched. It was argued by the
defaulting employee's counsel that when the contract provided for
yearly employment at a specific rate of pay per month, the contract be-
came divisible on a monthly basis.59 The judiciary, however, uniformly
denied the argument, declaring that this was merely a means used by
5sAs early as 1880 the following exjlanation was suggested as grounds for a
distinction between the right to recover for partially performed services and
the purchase money for land: "In the case of the suit to recover the purchase-
money of the land all that remains to be performed is required of the de-
fendant, and he may waive the privilege afforded by the statute of refusing to
convey. In the case of the suit to recover for partial services rendered, the de-
fence is that the plaintiff is bound to perform additional services; but these
services the plaintiff may refuse to perform, as his contract to that effect is
within the statute and not binding without writing. In the former case, that
which is within the statute is to be done by the defendant; and if he is willing
to do it, the plaintiff cannot force him to stand upon the statute. In the latter
case, that which is within the statute is to be done in part by the plaintiff, and
to force him to do it, by setting up the verbal contract -as a bar to his recovery
for the value of services rendered would be to enforce the verbal contract by
way of defence." BROWNE ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDs sec. 122a, p. 141 (4th ed.
1880).
59 Wright v. Turner, 1 Stewart 29 (Ala. 1827) ; De Camp v. Stevens, 4 Blackf.
24 (Ind. 1835); McMillan v. Vanderlip, 12 Johns. 165 (N.Y. 1815) (To be paid a
specified amount for each run of year spun, yet employee to work at spinningjob for entire year) ; Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1822) : "appellant was
to pay him $104 or 13 dollars per month, not 13 dollars at the end of every
month.. . ."; Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen 63 (N.Y. 1827).
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the contracting parties for conveniently calculating the entire sum. Rate
of payment did not create divisibility of contract.
In 1836, a distinction was drawn between rate of payment and
obligation to actually make periodic payment. The distinction was ac-
ceptable to create divisibility at the level of the lower court; however,
the Vermont Supreme Court was not ready to accept the distinction."
During the 1840's, however, the same argument was presented in the
Southern states of Alabama 61 and North Carolina,6 2 and both states
accepted the distinction granting contract relief to the defaulting em-
ployee for the completed month's service. The contract called for pay-
ment of salary on a periodic basis; divisibility of contract was thereby
created, and the abandoning employee recovered for service performed
to the date required for the last payment prior to default. All that the
employee forfeits by quitting without cause is the performance rendered
subsequent to this last pay period. He, of course, is still subject to
provable damages resulting from breach of his employment contract.
The Alabama decision followed by only two years a denial of resti-
tution by the same court for services on an entire contract that had
been terminated by the death of the employee. 63 The promise to pay
periodically made the contract divisible, allowing the intentionally de-
faulting employee to hurdle the requirement of condition precedent; on
the other hand, when the contract failed to specify the time of payment,
even death of the employee did not justify compensation for completed
performance. This indicates the unrealistic nature of judicial decisions
in attempting to evaluate the interest of the defaulter. Fortunately,
denial by reason of death was later repudiated by the Alabama court.6 4
This aspect of Cutler v. Powell has now been renounced both in Eng-
land and in the United States. Default in performance due to the
employee's illness likewise is no longer reason for denying the obli-
gation to pay for benefit received. 65
60 St. Albans Steamboat Co. v. Wilkins, 8 Vt. 54 (1836) : "The defendant's right
to retain full pay does not depend upon the fact, whether the hiring was by the
month or by the year." p. 56.
61 Davis v. Preston, 6 Ala. 83 (1844). Employed as superintendent of mill for
one year to be paid at end of six and twelve months. Completed six months
and therefore entitled to this payment.
62 Dover v. Plemmons, 32 N.C. 23 (1848). Six months at $8.00 per month, con-
tract providing for payments each month.
63 Givhan v. Dailey's Admx., 4 Ala. 336 (1842).
64 Recovery allowed: Coe v. Smith, 4 Ind. 779 (1853); Persons v. McKibben, 5
Ind. 261 (1854); Ricks v. Yates, 5 Ind. 115 (1854); Stanley v. Kimball, 80
N.H. 431, 118 Atl. 636 (1922); Parker v. Brown, 136 N.C. 285, 48 S.E. 657
(1904) ; Stubbs v. Holywell [1867] 36 L.J. Ex. 166; L.R., 2 Exch. 311, 16 L.T.
631; 15 W.R. 769, Digest 593, 4934 (now 5154); See also 6 Eng. Rul. Cas. 639(Annotation discussing American cases involving Cutler v. Powell).6 5 FEDERAL: Sickelco v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 111 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940).
ALABAMA:Green v. Linton, 7 Porter 133 (Ala. 1838).
CONNECrIcUT: Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 188 (1856).
MAINE: Preble v. Prebel, 115 Me. 26, 97 Atl. 9 (1916); King v. Barker, 62
At!. 211 (Me. 1948).
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During the 1850's the concept of divisibility based upon the con-
tractual provision for periodic payment was first adopted in the Eastern
states,16 and by the turn of the nineteenth century it had become clearly
established as a contract concept for recovery by the defaulting em-
ployee. 67 The test of divisibility, in the employment contract as in other
agreements, is primarily a question of the intent of the contracting
parties. Finding such intent from the express stipulation of periodic
payment in the contract creates little difficulty; however, before the
beginning of the twentieth century some courts had progressed to the
point of finding divisibility based upon the sole fact that the employer
had previously made certain payments to the employee as his work
progressed.68 Within less than a century the judicial attitude toward
use of divisibility in term employment contracts had completely changed.
During this same period with its increase in industrial labor con-
tracts it became customary to provide for term contract payments on
a periodic basis. To a lesser extent the same was true of the agricultural
contract. The farm hand no longer lived on the owner's farm, nor did
he receive his meals and lodging for his family as part of his agreement
to work on the farm. Many farm contracts still provided for seasonal
employment, but payment necessarily had to be made at shorter inter-
vals. The farm employee did not have the assets to carry him through
the season, and it was no longer customary for the employer to furnish
necessaries as the principal part of the farm laborer's compensation.
These inducements for periodic payments to both the industrial laborer
and the farm employee, when coupled with the judicial interpretation
MASSACHUSETTS: Fuller v. Brown, 11 Metc. 440 (Mass. 1846).
MICHIGAN: Ginsberg v. Reliable Linen Service Co., 292 Mich. 70, 290 N.W. 331
(1940).
MINNESOTA: Wallace v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 25 N.W2d 465 (Minn.
1947).
NE.w YORK: Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 197 (1859) ; Sabl v. Laenderbank Wien
Aktiengesellschaft, 30 N.Y.S.2d 608; 33 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1941).
VERMONT: Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557 (1839) ; Leaver v. Morse, 20 Vt. 620
(1847).
WISCONSIN: Greene v. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 401 (1867) ; see, however, Jennings v.
Lyon s, 39 Wis. 553 (1876) : denied on ground of forseeability of sickness.
ENGLAND:Scott v. Pattison [1923] 2 K.B. 723.
66 Dayton v. Dean, 23 Conn. 99 (1854); White v. Atkins, 8 Cush. 367 (Mass.
1851) (pointing out that Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 (N.Y.) in denying re-
covery had specifically remarked that there was no promise to pay monthly).
Cf. Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Metc. 286 (Mass. 1847) denying relief because
"There is no time fixed for payment and the law therefore fixes the time.... .";
Peck v. Burr, 10 N.Y. 300 (Illegal contract, but Justice Foot's dissent as obiter
dicta again distinguishes Reab v. Moor); Tipton v. Feitner, 20 N.Y. 423
(1859) (Obiter dicta by Justice Denio making same distinction based upon
time of payment); Winterhalter v. Johnson, 1 Ohio Dec. 575 (1851).
67 Hill v. Balkcom, 79 Ga. 444, 5 S.E. 200 (1888) ; White v. Gray, 4 Ill. App. 228
(1879); Schneider v. Hagerstown Brewing Co., 136 Md. 151, 110 Atl. 218
(1920); Mernagh v. Nichols, 132 App. Div. 509, 118 N.Y.S. 59 (1909);
Mathews v. Kennins, 80 Va. 463 (1885).
68 Ramsey v. Brown, 77 Miss. 124, 25 So. 151 (1899) ; Oliver v. McArthur, 158
App. Div. 241, 143 N.Y.S. 126 (1913); Chamblee v. Baker, 95 N.C. 98 (1886).
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of divisibility of contract based upon periodic wage payment, combined
to reduce steadily the harshness of the common law forfeiture rule for
abandoning contract performance. Recovery was permitted based on
the contract and at the contract rate of periodic payment. The quasi
contractual element involved only the element of performance since
the date of last required payment. This amount became material only
when the required periodic payments were widely spaced or the nature
of the employment still required complete performance before any
wages had to be paid.
THE LAw OF ENGLAND
The application of divisibility of the employment contract based
upon accrued periodic payments developed in the United States in the
1840's and 1850's. During this same period the famous English case of
Taylor v. Laird"9 was decided. This case involved the captain of a ship
who abandoned performance of his contract before completion. The
defendant's offer to the captain used the words "Your pay to be at the
rate of 50,f per month." Plaintiff's letter in reply used the expression
"pay of 50, per month" accepted. Lord Pollock saw the contract as
divisible due to the requirement of periodic pay periods: "the words
were plain, and no mercantile man would doubt what was meant."
Underlying the decision, however, is Pollock's comment that
"if the meaning is not given, the result would be, that had the
plaintiff died or the voyage failed at the last moment, nothing
would be payable by the defendant, because, according to his
contention, the performance of the entire work contracted for
was a condition precedent to the right to receive anything. This
cannot have been intended." (Emphasis added.)
The severity of the English attitude towards impossibility of per-
formance steming from Cutler v. Powell directly affected Pollock's ap-
proach to the issue of contract divisibility. The sea-captain had not died
but had abandoned performance; yet to Pollock the requirement of
condition precedent in entire contracts could recognize no distinction
based upon the cause of default. It, therefore, became necessary to ex-
tend recovery based upon the contract to the defaulter. This recovery
came in the form of implied divisibility founded on the employer's
contractual obligation to make periodic wage payments. The result can-
not be criticized as it greatly reduced the employee's wage forfeiture.
True contract divisibility is supposed to be founded on the intent
of the contracting parties. In Taylor v. Laird it was suggested to the
Court that defendant
"would never have agreed to pay the plaintiff at the rate of 50£
a month if the latter had not agreed to go the whole voyage.
69 Taylor v. Laird [1856] 1 Hurlst. & N. 266, 25 L.J. Exch. N.S. 329 (1869).
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The case is similar to that of a contract to make a perfect article
for a certain sum of money; in which case, unless it is com-
pleted, the workman cannot recover either for the materials used
or for the work done."
If this was the employer's intent, then it certainly could not also be
claimed that he also intended to create a divisible contract by means of
the provision for periodic payments. Defendant's argument carries us
back to similar reasoning used in Cutler v. Powell. Both contracts in-
volved a sea captain, and in both there was a promise to complete per-
formance. The intent to create an aleatory contract was found in the
Cutler decision primarily on the basis of the amount that the seaman
was to receive as compared to the usual rate of pay. This issue was not
considered in Taylor v. Laird, and Pollock's reply to the issue of the
parties' intent was merely the suggestion that
"the agreements should be construed as though made on the
supposition that both parties would observe them, not break
them, and on the supposition that plaintiff's construction is
reasonable, and the defendant's is not."
Should the supposition that both parties at the same time they signed
the employment contract intended in good faith to complete agreed
performance influence the issue as to their intent as to what rights
would be created by part performance? If the contract payments had
been disproportionately large, then it might be argued that the de-
fendant-employer desired to shift the risk of non-performance onto
the plaintiff-seaman; but the mere presumption of good faith per-
formance should not create the same inference. And as to Pollock's
suggestion that plaintiff's construction (of divisiblity) is more reason-
able than defendant's (condition precedent), reasonableness of con-
struction must either be based upon intent of the parties (subjective)
or general intent as interpreted by the court (objective). From Pol-
lock's statement the grounds for his construction are not apparent. It
is submitted that the obstacle of condition precedent required the Court
to "imply" divisibility based, at best, upon an objective standard of
construction of intent.
The English courts' broad application of divisibility lead Justice
Montague Smith, a decade later, into the use of the same reasoning on
divisibility as his predecessor. In Button v. Thompson," again in-
volving the employment of a seaman, it was clearly established that he
had been left behind because, as the jury found, he had been "guilty
of drunkenness and abusive language subversive of discipline." His
inability to complete his contract was found to be the result of his own
"negligence and misconduct." Yet, in deciding whether the contract
70 Button v. Thompson, L.R. 4 C.P. 330, 38 LJ.C.P. 225; 20 L.T. 568, 17 W.R.
1067; 3 Mar. L.C. 231.
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words "per calendar month" created a divisible contract, Justice Smith
commented that similar words were to be found in the Taylor v. Laird
contract and that he desired to apply the same construction previously
used in that case by the Court of Exchequer. This reluctance to create
a forfeiture underlies the liberal interpretation of divisibility, and is
observed in Justice Smith's statement that
"If the defendant's construction were to prevail, the plaintiff,
notwithstanding he had faithfully served in the ship during the
intermediate voyages mentioned in the articles, yet, if being
ashore at the last port at which the ship touched, he was unable
to rejoin her from some negligence however slight, or even from
accident or mistake, would be unable to recover any part of his
wages." (Emphasis added.)
Apprehension in the 1850's of possibl6 forfeiture in cases of default
resulting from death, and by negligence, accident or mistake in the
1860's, created a liberal interpretation of term employment contract
divisibility. This apprehension of forfeiture resulted in contract re-
covery for part performance to the sea captain who refused to complete
his contract, and to the seaman who because of his own misconduct
was unable to perform.
The twentieth century English decisions of Parkin v. South Hetton
Coal Company7' and George v. Davies72 follow the earlier view that a
requirement for periodic payment creates a divisibility of contract. This
same concept of divisibility has now been applied in England in a case
where an employee who would not resign was discharged by his em-
ployer because, as managing director of the defendant's company, he
had transmitted to the defendant false and misleading reports and ac-
counts of the business.7 3
LAw OF CANADA
Canadian cases on divisibility of the employment contract did not
arise until near the end of the nineteenth century, at which time re-
covery was allowed in several decisions.7 4 All of these cases relied on
Taylor v. Laird75 as their authority. In 1907, in Mousseau v. Tone,76
the Canadian court followed the English and American position that
contractual provision for periodic payment created an implied divisi-
7' [1907] 98 LT. 162, 24 T.L.R. 193 C.A. (Amount due for each days work ascer-
tained daily but paid every 14 days).
72 [19111 2 K.B. 445: Based partly upon custom within community that employee
could quit at end of first month and get paid for that month's services.7 Healey v. Societe Anonyme Francaise Rubastic [1917] 1 K.B. 946. (Salary of
2500L per annum payable monthly and previously paid at end of each month).
74 Feneron v. O'Keefe [1884]. 2 Man. R. 40 (C.A.) (Cites Taylor v. Laird as
authority); Johnston v. Kennan [1894] 3 Terr. L.R. 239; Taylor v. Kinsey
[1899] 4 Terr. L.R. 178 (Cites Taylor v. Laird and Button v. Thompson as
authority).
75 See Supra note 69.
76 [1907] 6 W.L.R. 117, 7 Terr. L.R. 369 (C.A.).
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bility in favor of the defaulting employee. Subsequent decisions in
19117 and 192078 reaffirmed this view.
The question of interpretation arose in 1927 in Cowan v. EislerT
involving the hiring of a farm laborer for the season at "wages of $55
per month." The defendant asserted that the language was used only
to fix the rate of compensation, an argument that had at one time re-
ceived favorable hearing on both sides of the Atlantic. The Canadian
Court, recognizing the effect of forfeiture that would result from such
interpretation, expressed the view that "such a result should be pro-
vided for by nothing less than clear language or unequivocal implica-
tions ... ."80 Similar language in favor of presumed divisibility and
the presumption of implied forfeiture is also found in several decisions
in the United States.8 ' This concept of divisibility based on the con-
tract requirement of periodic payments is now firmly established, hav-
ing recently been reaffirmed.82
STATUTORY DmSIBILITY
The collective bargaining strength of the industrial employee has
increased materially in the United States since the beginning of the
twentieth century. The employee, however, continued to be dependent
upon the current receipt of his contract wages. He often had little as-
sets other than his wages, and, due to the absence of collateral security,
he could not secure extended credit to cover his subsistence for ex-
tended periods . The employer, therefore, retained a forceful weapon by
means of his power to withhold the employee's earned wages. In ad-
dition some of the large industrial firms also used the device of com-
peling the employee to accept his compensation in payment other than
legal tender. The usual payment consisted in a right to goods from the
company store. In order to alleviate the injustice caused by these
devices to the employee, the English Parliament during the nineteenth
century passed the Truck Acts requiring that all employees receive
payment for their work in legal tender. Similar statutes have now
been passed in most of the United States.8 3
After the turn of the twentieth century the legislatures of various
states in the United States began to pass statutes regulating th time
and manner of payment of the industrial employee's wages. The year
77Grant v. Bradley [19111 18 W.L.R. 668, 4 Sask L.R. 505 (C.A.).
78 Abramoff v. Podratz; Feodoroff v. Poratz. [1920] 2 W.W.R. 6, 13 Sask. L.R.
215; 51 D.L.R. 313 (C.A.) Cf. Berg v. Cowie, 40 D.L.R. 250 (Sask. C.A.)(justices agreed on monthly divisiblity but dissent as to the part of last month
prior to quitting. Employee quit because employer used abusive language).
79 [1927] 1 W.W.R. 776, 36 Man. R. 464, 2 D.L.R. 713 (C.A.).80 Supra note 79 p. 714.
81 See Supra note 68.
82 R. v. Wagner (1951) 14 C.R. 167, 4 W.W.R. (N.S.) 666 (Sask.).
83 Statutes Regulating Defaulting Employee's Recovery For Servuices Rendered,
43 HARV. L. REv. 647, 651, note 41, 1929. Smith, The Constitutionality of Bi-
monthly Pay Day Laws, 16 TEqNr. L. REv. 940, 943 (1941).
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of 1919 saw a great influx in the passage of statutes of this nature.
These statutes generally covered all persons, firms and corporations
engaged in manufacturing and industrial occupations, but few of them
specifically included farming or domestic service.8 4 The overwhelming
majority of states today have passed statutes requiring that certain
employees receive their wages periodically. The most common period
of required payment is semi-monthly, a few states requiring payment
weekly, and none of the statutes allowing the employer to withhold
payment of earned wages beyond one month. These periodic payment
statutes are set forth and analyzed in the appendix following this
article. Many of these statutes include provisions relating to the em-
ployee who abandons performance or who is discharged before the
contract is executed.8 5
The principal purpose motivating enactment of these statutes was
the legislative desire to deprive the employer of too potent a weapon
with which to combat strikes and collective bargaining by the employee.
The indirect result, however, was to reduce the extent of forfeiture
imposed by the earlier judicial decisions on the defaulting employee.
Shortening the time permitted between pay periods lessens performance
value that can be lost by the abandoning employee. The judicial inter-
pretation of divisibility assured payment through the pay period pre-
ceding date of termination. This, coupled with the legislation reducing
the possible length of the periodic pay period, very nearly eliminated
the legal problem of wage forfeiture for many employees.
A number of legal articles have dealt with these divisibility stat-
utes ;88 and it is agreed by both McGowan 7 and Corbins8 that these
enactments should reduce the problem of the abandoning employee's
performance interest and that the small amount of litigation that will
remain should receive sympathetic consideration from the courts based
upon liberal interpretation of these statutes 9 Such favorable judicial
84 No periodic pay statute was found in the District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii
or the Virgin Islands.
85 Appendix A following this article sets forth the general statutes relating to
periodic pay periods, and Appendix B includes those statutes dealing specifically
with the employee's abandonment or discharge.
86 McGowan, The Divisibility of Employment Contracts, 21 IOWA L. Rav. 50
(1935); Smith, The Constitutionality of Bimonthly Pay Day Laws, 16 TENN.
L. REv. 940 (1941); Statutes Regulating Defaulting Employee's Recovery For
Services Rendered, 43 HARV. L. REv. 647 (1929); Legislative Regulation of
Wage Payment and Collection, 39 COL. L. REv. 238, 249 (1939).
87 McGowan, supra note 86 at p. 74.
88 5 CoRBIN ON CONTRACrS sec. 1127, pp. 566-7.
89 "It is believed that modern labor legislation and the attitude displayed by the
courts interpreting and applying it will tend strongly in support of allowing re-
covery as was done more than a century ago in Britton v. Turner." Ibid., p.
566. Professor McGowan in 1935, however, disagreed with Williston as to the
majority view of the courts as to finding the defaulting employee's contract
divisible. McGowan finds that although "A lining up of the cases chronologi-
cally indicates a trend toward a more liberal view, it is not very marked.. .. "
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construction of these statutes will create substantial justice between
the contracting parties. The employee is permitted to recover compen-
sation for his performance, and, at the same time, the employer is al-
lowed recoupment in the form of monetary damages for the injury
sustained.90 The disadvantage of forcing an unwilling employer to ac-
cept the burden of proving the extent of his injury and transposing this
into monetary terms is still involved, but this disadvantage should not
outweigh the advantages running to both parties from the use of the
concept of divisibility. Recovery in quasi contract today requires a
judicial determination distinguishing the deserving from the un-
deserving employee. Fault, and the intangible will-o'-the-wisp "wil-
fulness," have to be reckoned with, while divisibility as a contract
concept cuts through these complexities and allows recovery on the
simple basis of accrued debt.
The amount of litigation involving recovery for partial performance
by the abandoning employee has greatly decreased during the past
quarter century. This is in part attributable to the judicial attitude
toward divisibility, and in part to the twentieth century legislative en-
actments shortening periodic wage payment periods. In addition, how-
ever, there are several other factors that have reduced the amount of
litigation reaching the appellate level. Modem employment contracts
do not often involve long periods of performance, and consequently the
amount involved at the time the employee quits is often too small for
prolonged litigation. In addition, the employee signing the long term
employment contract is frequently sufficiently acute to protect his
own interests, or has receJived adequate legal advice so that the
contract specifies the interests of the parties upon the contingency of
default. The advent of collective bargaining and the increased strength
of the employees' union have also reduced the amount of litigation.
Arbitration of employees' disputes has also reduced litigation.
There has also been a general change in attitude as to the purpose
of the employment contract. Today the industrial employer must adjust
his production by means of a fairly flexible employment policy. Short
term employment contracts have frequently become economically ad-
visable in order that the employer can adjust his production to variance
in demand. The employee loses some of his security but to a certain
extent has subsituted the protection of seniority and union membership.
Flexible employment is at times an advantage to the employee as well
as his employer.
Although flexible employment contracts with mutual termination
rights upon monthly notice have become more frequent, the problem of
And to McGowan, Williston's statement that the majority view of the courts
has changed is "neither definite nor emphatic." Supra note 86, p. 60 n. 66.90 See similar judicial expression by Minnesota court in McGrath v. Cannon, 55
Minn. 457, 57 N.W. 150 (1893).
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the defaulting employee nonetheless has not been completely solved.
McGowan estimates that not more than one-half of the nation's wage
earners are included within the terms of periodic wage payment stat-
utes, and many of these statutes apply only to specified types of em-
ployment.91 Many do not contain provisions for the employee who is
discharged or abandons performance. 92 The number of appellate re-
ported cases involving attempted recovery for part performance by the
defaulting employee has declined during the past few decades; how-
ever, it has been pointed out that the majority of earlier appellate
decisions involved farm hands, sharecroppers, contracts based upon
promises to support in exchange for money or devise of land, and oc-
casionally the contract for a specific piece of labor.93 These contracts
lie outside of present statutory protection in many jurisdictions. Two
seemingly conflicting reasons have been offered to explain this decline
in appellate litigation: first, many defaulting laborers choose to suffer a
loss rather than incur the expense of carrying a case through the courts
with the ultimate possibility of an unfavorable decision; and second,
because trial courts are disposing of these cases in a sensible manner.94
Both of the above reasons may be applicable; however, the change
in attitude towards long term fixed employment contracts and the social
tendency to adjust compensation upon default rather than create large
forfeitures, have also influenced this reduction in litigation. In ad-
dition, the advent of collective bargaining, increased use of arbitration
of employment disputes, the shift of the United States from an agrar-
ian to an industrial nation, and the judicial use of the concept of divisi-
bility of contract based upon contractual obligation of periodic pay-
ment have all combined in varying degree to reduce the seriousness of
the forfeiture of the abandoning employee. Emphasis today in employ-
ment default cases has shifted to bonus rights, profits sharing plan
interest and accrued vacation interest. The problem of forfeiture of
completed performance on the long term employment contract still
affects the seasonal farm employment contract and the contract for sup-
port of the aged relative as well as other long term employment agree-
ments. What solution is feasible to protect both the interests of the em-
ployer and the defaulting employee? In 1942, the New York Law Re-
vision Commission studied the problem and suggested a solution that,
91 McGowan, The Divisibility of Employment Contracts, 21 IowA L. REv. 50, 57.
57.
92iNcGowan, supra note 86, p. 74. The statutes of Oregon, Utah and Wisconsin
(Wis. STATS. (1953) §103.39) extend only to the abandoning employee who is
not under contract.
93 Mulder, The Defaulting Plaintiff in North Carolina, 15 N.C. L. REV. 255, 266
(1937).
94 Ibid. p. 265, note 68. It should be pointed out that Mulder's survey of cases is
limited primarily to North Carolina: however, the State's combined agricul-
tural and industrial makeup should be fairly representative.
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athough not adopted in New York, has considerable merit. One of the
basic provisions within this suggested legislation was that twenty per-
cent of contract value could be retained by the employer, as an auto-
matic forfeiture for the employee's default. Petty and inconsequential
performance suits are thereby eliminated from litigation; the employer
is saved the burden of proving small damages and is assured of some
retention of compensation to compensate for those damages incapable
of evidentiary proof. The employee is given the protection against
complete forfeiture of his completed performance and is therefore
often safeguarded against major loss when a substantial amount of the
contract had been completed at the time he quit.
The legal position of the defaulting employee has materially
changed within the past century. Condition precedent, entirety of con-
tract, and wilfulness of breach are terms still to be reckoned with, as
well as the legal philosophy of discouraging breach by imposing forfei-
ture, and the reluctance to "rewrite the contract" or to impose implied
contracts where express agreements still exist. These expressions are
still to be found in employment contract decisions, but the effect of
the nineteenth century attitude towards the defaulter has now dimin-
ished.
Sir Henry Maime, writting in 1861, expressed the view that the
"movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from status to contract."9 5 The twentieth century has shown a closing
of the circle. Modern employment legislation, whether it relate to un-
employment insurance, Workman's Compensation Acts, Mimimum
Hour and Wage Laws, or the presently considered periodic wage pay-
ment statutes, has shown a gradual reversal from the nineteenth
century individualism with its contractual freedom without security.
The trend is again toward status with its increase in individualistic
security and corresponding reduction in contractual rights. Status,
however, no longer connotes master and servant relationship, but rights
and duties created by legislative control. "It is to be hoped that this
status will allow enjoyment of freedom of action and greater flexibility
than the 'status' of primitive law."9 6
95 SIR HENRY MAImE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
96 Milner, The Law of Contract: 1923-1947, 26 CAN. B. REv. 116, 136 (1948).
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APPENDIX A
PERIODIC EMPLOYMENT WAGE PAYMENT STATUTES
ALABAMA: Ai.A. REv. CODE (1940) §48-474: Provides that "Every public serv-
ice corporation engaged in transportation doing business in this state,
employing as many as fifty or more employees" is "Required to make full
payment to employees for services performed as often as once every two
weeks or twice during each calendar month and such payment or settle-
ment shall include all amounts due for labour or services performed up to
not less than 15 days previous to the time of payment." Penalty: "Violators
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction fined not less than
$25 nor more than $250 for each offense and each day's violation against
each employee shall constitute a separate offense." (Held constitutional:
Rep. Atty. Gen. of Alabama 1932-34, p. 143.)
ARIZONA: ARIZ. CODE (1939) §43-1601: Applied to the State and every com-
pany or corporation doing business and employing labor within the State.
Payment: Twice in every month not more than 16 days apart. Penalty:
Misdemeanor with fine of not less than $50 nor more than $300.
ARKANSAS: ARK. STAT. (1947) §81:301: Applies to corporations. Payment:
Semi-monthly: Penalty: Violation constitutes a misdemeanor with fine of
not less than $50 nor more than $500 for each offense.
CALIFORNIA: CALIF. LABOR CODE (1944) §204: General statute coverage;
Payment: Semi-monthly; Penalty: both criminal and civil penalties. Ap-
plied to wages that are "earned." First passed in 1919.
§205: Applies to farm laborers and domestic help when boarded and
lodged by employer: Payment must be made at least once every month.
§§3001-3002: (§3001) "A servant is presumed to have been hired for such
length of time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages. A hiring
at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year; at a daily rate for one
day; a hiring by piecework, for no specific time." (§3002) "In the absence
of any agreement or custom as to the term of service, the time of payment,
or the rate of wages, a servant is presumed to be hired by the month, at
a monthly rate of reasonable wages to be paid when the service is per-
formed."
COLORADO: COL. STAT. ANN. (1935) §97:200. Applies only to corporations;
Payment: Semi-monthly; Penalty: Five per cent of wages due and not
paid.
CONNECTICUT: CONN. GEN. LAWS REv. (1949) §7361. Payment required
every week. Penalty: Fine of $200 or not more than 30 days imprisonment
or both.
GEORGIA: GA. CODE (1933) §66:102-106. Excludes farming, turpentine and
sawmill industries. Payment; Semi-monthly. Criminal punishment.
ILLINOIS: ILL. REv. STAT. (1953) §48:36. Limited to corporation employees.
Payment: Semi-monthly. Penalty: Conviction constitutes misdemeanor
with maximum fine of $100.
INDIANA: BURNS' IND. STAT. ANN. (1933) §40:101. Applies to "person, firm
corporation or association," but farmers are not covered. Payment: Semi-
monthly; Penalty: Payment not to exceed wages due and unpaid plus
ten per cent payable "if requested."
§40:104: Payment must be made every week if requested by employees in
mining and manufacturing businesses. Earlier statute making regular
payment of wages mandatory held unconstitutional. Superior Laundry
Co. v. Rose, 193 Ind. 138, 137 N.E. 761 (1923).
IOWA: IowA CODE (1950) §477.51; 477.52. Applies only to railroads. Payment:
Semi-monthly.
KANSAS: KAN. GEN. STAT. (1949) §44-301; Applies only to corporations;
§44-312 (general application) Payment: Semi-monthly. Civil penalty.
KENTUCKY: KEN. STAT. (1936) §337.020. Limited to those engaged in mining.
Must work at least 10 people. Payment: Semi-monthly. Criminal penalty.
LOUISIANA: LA. Rav. STAT. (1950) §23:633. Applies to employers of more
than ten persons in manufacturing, mining, oil industries and public service
corporations. Does not apply to a clerical force or salesmen of public
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service corporations. Payment: Semi-monthly. Penalty for violation: Not
less than $25 nor more than $250 in fine or not less than ten days im-
prisonment or both.
MAINE: ME. REv. STAT. (1944) §38:556. Broad coverage: Applies to every
person, partnership and corporation engaged in the manufacturing, mech-
anical, mining, quarrying, mercantile, restaurant, street railway, telegraph
and telephone business, in any building trade, in all public works, to rail-
roads, water works and the like, to the State, its officials, boards, and com-
missioners and to counties, cities and towns. Payment must be made every
week. Criminal penalty for violation. (See Smith, The Constitutionality
of Bi-Monthly Pay Day Laws, 16 TENN. L. REV. 940 at 943 (1941), com-
paring the broad Maine statute with the limited act of Maryland).
MARYLAND: MD. ANN. CODE (1951) Art. 23, §135. Statute applies to "every
association or corporation doing business within the State of Maryland."
At one time statute applied only to corporations incorporated under the
laws of the State and engaged in mining and shipping coal in Allegheny
County. See Smith, The Constitutionality of Bi-Monthly Pay Day Laws,
16 TENN. L. REv. 940 at 943 (1941). Payment must be semi-monthly;
violation constitutes a misdemeanor with a maximum fine of $200.
MASSACHUSETTS: MASS. GEN. LAWS. (1951) Ch. 149, §148. Does not apply
to hospitals or co-operative associations. Payment weekly except agri-
cultural workers and domestic servants who are paid monthly. Penalty:
$50 fine or two months imprisonment or both. Persons cannot contract
away statutory rights.
MICHIGAN: MIcHi. CoiiP. LAwS (1948) §408.541. General coverage of almost
all employees. Payment must be made at least semi-monthly.
MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. (1949) §§181.08, 181.09. Applies to public service
corporations. Payment to be made semi-monthly. Originally passed in
1915. Penalty consists only in the payment of small extra costs in case of
suit.
§181.10. Applies to persons engaged in labor of a transitory nature. Must
be paid every fifteen days. Penalty: No penalty is specifically provided for
violation of this section. "Apparently it is purely regulatory legislation."
See 16 TENN. L. Ray. 940 at 941 (1941).
MISSISSIPPI: Miss. ANN. CODE (1942) §6994. Applies only to manufacturers
who employ fifty or more people. Payment must be at least semi-monthly.
MISSOURI: Mo. Rav. STAT. (1949) §290.080. General statute applying to all
corporations. Payment must be made at least semi-monthly. Penalty: $50
to $500 fine for each offense.
§290.090. Specific statute applying to manufacturers. Payment must be
made every 15 days. Penalty: Double the sum due such employee at the
time of such failure to pay the wages due, to be recovered by civil action.
Statutory provisions cannot be waived.
MONTANA: MONT. REv. CODE (1947) §41:1301; §41:1303 Agricultural labor
expected. Payment to be made every 15 days. Penalty: Five per cent of
wages due and unpaid as civil penalty. Violation constitutes a misdemeanor.
NEBRASKA: NaB. ComP. STAT. (1943) (1950 reissue) §74:585. Applies only
to railroad employees. Payment: Semi-monthly. Penalty: $25 for each
violation, one half to the person suing and the other half to the State.
NEVADA: NEv. Comip. LAWS (1929) §2775. General statute. Payment: At least
semi-monthly. Both civil and criminal penalty. Forbids the parties to
avoid the provisions of the statute.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: N.H. STAT. (1951) Ch. 124, §1; Ch. 212, §§15, 16. Statute
worded so as to protect only the employee who works by the day or week.
Criminal punishment for violation.
NEW JERSEY: N.J. REv. STAT. (1937) §§34:11-4; 34:11-2. Employer must
employ at least ten people. Agriculture and watermen excluded. Payment:
Semi-monthly. Civil penalty.
NEW MEXICO: N. MEx. STAT. (1941) §57: 301, 302, 304. General statute
covering railroads, mining and manufacturing. Payment: Semi-monthly.
NEW YORK: N.Y. LADOR LAW (Supp. 1938) §196: General statute requiring
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payment weekly; exception for steam surface railroads where employees
must be paid semi-monthly (§196). Penalty: Both civil and criminal.
Fine of $50 per offense (§198). Provisions cannot be waived [§193(3)].
"Wages," however, has been defined as hourly pay for manual labor as
opposed to salary or fee. 179 Misc. 225, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 684 (1942).
Patterson commenting on the New York statute: "The Labor Law pro-
vision, if it does affect the severability of personal service contracts,
leaves important gaps with respect to (a) the class of persons rendering
personal service, (b) the class of persons to whom the services are
rendered, (c) the units or portions of service to which compensation is
apportioned." Restitution for Benefit Conferred by a Party in Default
Under a Contract, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (f) 1942, p. 46.
NORTH CAROLINA: N.C. CoDE (1950) §60-55. Applies only to railroads and
repair shops which work at least ten persons. Payment: Semi-monthly.
Penalty: No penalty either civil or criminal. (See Smith, The Constitution-
ality of Bi-Monthly Pay Day Laws, 16 TENN. L. REv. 940, 941 n.6. Smith
places North Carolina in a separate classification as "the statute provides
for no penalty, either civil or criminal for failure to comply").
NORTH DAKOTA: N.D. REv. CODE (1943) §49:0823. Applies only to railroad
corporations. Payment: Semi-Monthly.
OHIO: OHIo GEN. CODE (Baldwin 1948) §12-946-1. General statute coverage,
but employer must employ at least five people. Payment: Semi-monthly.
Punishment: Fine of $25 to $100 per offense. §12-946-2 forbids the parties
to avoid the effect of the statute.
OKLAHOMA: OKLA. STAT. §40-161; (Mining and transportation companies)
§40-162; §40-164 (General statute). Payment: Semi-monthly. §45-305:
Coal mining employing more than three people. Payment of wages must
be demanded.
OREGON: ORE. CODE ANN. §102-602. General coverage. Requires payment
monthly, but mutually satisfactory agreements between employer and em-
ployee to pay at a future time are permissible. (§102-602) Punishment:
Violation is a misdemeanor. Fine of not more than $500. (§102-603).
PENNSYLVANIA: PA. STAT. (Purdon 1952) tit. 43, §251-3. General coverage.
Payment: Semi-monthly. Penalty: Misdemeanor with maximum $100 fine
(§43-252). §43-251, however, provides that the statute applies "Unless
otherwise stipulated in the contract of hiring" and also covers "employed
persons other than on an annual salary." For judicial decisions involving
contractual modification of statute see Commonwealth v. Muller, 31
D.&C. 372, 39 Lack. Jur. 55 (Pa. 1937); Commonwealth v. Dranga, 97
P.L.J. 321 (Pa. Com. P1. 1950).
RHODE ISLAND: R.I. STAT. (1941) ch. 1069; (1942) ch. 1237. "Every em-
ployer other than religious, literary or charitable corporations, the state or
any political subdivision thereof, must pay weekly to employees except
those whose compensation is fixed at yearly, monthly or semi-monthly
rate." Weekly pay. Penalty: $50 to $100 fine or 10 to 90 day imprisonment
or both.
SOUTH CAROLINA: S.C. CoDE (1952) §40-116. Coverage: Textile industry.
Not covered: Railroad, agricultural labor, lumber logging, telegraph and
telephone companies, and oyster canning or shucking plants. Wages in tex-
tile employment must be paid weekly. Penalty: Fine of not less than $100
nor more than $200 for each violation.
SOUTH DAKOTA: S.D. CODE (1939) §17.0503. Wages are presumed, in ab-
sence of contrary agreement, to be monthly and payable when the services
are performed.
TENNESSEE: TENN. CODE (1934) §6713-20. Must pay semi-monthly when more
than five persons employed. Criminal punishment.
TEXAS: TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp. 1938) §5155. Coverage: Every
corporation or any person or firm engaged in public work for state, county
or municipal corporation must pay employees' wages semi-monthly. For-
merly applied only when ten or more persons employed, now amended to
cover "one or more" employees. Civil penalty.
UTAH: UTAH LAWS (1953) §34-10-4. General statute coverage: Payment:
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Semi-monthly; but if on a yearly salary, payment may be on a monthly
basis with pay day to be on the seventh of the month. Both civil and
criminal penalty.
VERMONT: VT. PUB. LAWS (1947 revision) §8203. Coverage: Specified cor-
porations. Payment: Weekly. Penalty: $50. Suit to be brought in name of
State attorney, but advance notice of intent to bring suit must first be
given to employer.
VIRGINIA: VA. CODE (1950) §§40-23; 40-24. Statutory coverage: Mining, rail-
road and manufacturing companies. Payment: Semi-monthly, except that
excelsior and saw mill employees may be paid monthly. Criminal punish-
ment.
WEST VIRGINIA: W. VA. CODE (1949) §2350. Coverage: Railroads. Payment:
Semi-monthly. Penalty: $25 fine per offense. Suit must be brought within
sixty days after wages become due and payable.§2352. Coverage: All persons and corporations other than railroads. Pay-
ment: Semi-monthly. Can be modified by specific contract agreement.
WISCONSIN: Wis. STAT. (1953) §103.39: "When wages payable: Pay orders.(1) Every person, firm or corporation engaged in any enterprise or busi-
ness for pecuniary profit within the state of Wisconsin shall as often as on
the fifteenth and on the last day of each month pay to every employee
engaged in its business, except those employees engaged in hospitals, or
sanatoriums, logging operations, farm labor, domestic service, or employees
employed on a salary basis equal to at least $350 per month, all wages or
salaries earned by such employee to a day not more than 16 days prior to
the date of such payment. Any such employee who is absent at the time
fixed for payment or who for any other reason is not paid at that time
shall be paid thereafter at any time upon 6 days demand .... No person,
firm or corporation coming within the meaning of this section shall by
special contract with employees, or by any other means secure exception
from the provisions of this section, and each and every employee coming
within the meaning of this section shall have a right of action against any
such person, firm or corporation for the full amount of his wages due on
each regular pay day as herein provided, in any court of competent juris-
diction. Whenever such regular payments cover wages earned to a date
more than 8 days prior to the day of payment in the event the day fixed
for the semi-monthly payment falls on Sunday, or a holiday, payment shall
be made on the previous business day." (Emphasis added.)
Subsection (3) provides that "In an action by an employee against his
employer on a wage claim, no security for payment of costs shall be re-
quired . . ." However, in State ex rel Martin v. Reis, 230 Wis. 683, 284
N.W. 582 (1939), it was held that "employer" did not include the State of
Wisconsin, and therefore bond for court costs had to be furnished in a suit
by an employee for services performed for the State as employer.
WYOMING: Wyo. COMp. STAT. (1945) §§54-601; 54-603. Coverage: Mines,
railroads, oil refineries, factories, mills and workshops. Payment: Semi-
monthly. Penalty: Criminal punishment, fine and/or imprisonment. The
contracting parties may agree to payment at other intervals, but the em-
ployee cannot require such agreement as a condition of remaining or en-
tering into the employer's service.
APPENDIX B
WAGE PAYMENT STATUTES WHEN EMPLOYEE
TERMINATES EMPLOYMENT
ALASKA: ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. (1949) §43-2-11: "... Where the la-
borer's or employee's services are terminated regardless of the cause of
termination, all wages, salaries, or other compensation for labor or services
shall become due immediately and shall be paid within 24 hours after such
termination." (Emphasis added.) Penalty: Fine of not more than $1,000
for each offense or imprisonment for not more than one year or both,
and each day's continuance of the violation is a separate offense (41-1-12).
Alaska's periodic wage payment statute (same citation) requires wages be
paid at least once each mnonth and applies to both individual employers and
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corporations. Provisions of the statute can be changed by written contract
of the parties.
ARIZONA: ARiz. REv. CODE (1939) §43.1602. Covers both the employee who
"quits the service or is discharged therefrom." Payment of wages that
are due must be paid at once and violation of statute is a misdemeanor.
See Arizona Power Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 114, 166 Pac. 275 (1917). Em-
ployee of Power Co. quit on 23rd of September. $22.07 was due and un-
paid. Not paid until next regular pay day on October 5. Held: Power Co.
violated the Arizona statute.
ARKANSAS: ARK. STAT. (1947) §51-508: "If any laborer shall without good
cause abandon his employment before the expiration of his contract he
shall be liable to such employer for the full amount of any account he may
owe him, and shall forfeit to his employer all wages or share of crops
which might become due him from his employer." (Emphasis added.)
See Latham v. Barwick, 87 Ark. 328, 113 S.W. 646 (1908), which denies
recovery to farm hand. "A statute of this state enacted in 1883 puts the
question entirely at rest." The statute has been observed to be "remin-
iscent of the Ancient Statute of Laborers." See also Rand v. Walton,
130 Ark. 431, 197 S.W. 852 (1917) ; Crawford v. Slatten, 155 Ark. 283, 244
S.W. 321 (1922).
§81-308 permitting recovery for due wages to discharged employee has
been specifically held not applicable to the employee who quits his em-
ployment without cause. See Caldwell v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 137
Ark 439, 208 S.W. 790 (1918).
CALIFORNIA: CAL. LABOR CODE (1944) §202: "If an employee not having a
written contract for a definite period quits his employment, his wages shall
become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter." (If employee
gives 72 hours advance notice of quitting, then he must be paid at time
employment terminated). (Emphasis added.) See also LABOR CODE §2927.
CANAL ZONE CODE: (1934) §§1347, 1348. Employee not hired for a specified
tine is entitled to compensation for his services up to the date of discharge,
whether quitting or being dismissed.
COLORADO: COL. ANN. STAT. §97-202. Permits recovery of earned wages to
discharged employee but provides that "Nothing in this section shall apply
to the employee who quits of his own accord." (Emphasis added.)
CONNECTICUT: CONN. GEx. STAT. (1949) §7361: "If he voluntarily leaves, he
must be paid in full on next regular pay day." Maximum fine for viola-
tion of the statute is $200 or imprisonment for not more than 30 days or
both.
ILLINOIS: ILL. REv. STAT. (1953) §48:36. Applies only to corporation em-
ployees: "Any employee leaving his or her employment or discharged
therefrom shall be paid in full following his or her dismissal or volun-
tarily leaving at any time within three days after leaving. Nothing in
this act shall apply to earnings on a commission basis." (Cannot contract
right away.)§48:39(h). If the employee makes less than $200 per month, his employer
must pay earned wages not later than five days after discharge, and at the
next regular pay day when employee quits-unless employee gives five
days' notice before quitting.
INDIANA: BURNS' IND. STAT. ANN. (1933) (1952 Replacement) §40-101:
"Should any employee voluntarily leave his employment, either permanently
or temporarily, such employer shall not be required to pay such employee
any amount due such employee until the next usual and regular day for
payment of wages as established by such employer."
IOWA: IOWA CODE (1950) §§477.51, 477.52: ". . . and any employee leaving his
or her employment or discharged therefrom shall be paid in full follow-
ing his or her dismissal or voluntarily leaving his or her employment at
any time upon six days demand." (Part of Iowa periodic wage payment
statute which is limited to railway employees).
KANSAS: KAN. REv. STAT. (1949) §§44-307, 44-308: If employee (limited to
corporation employees) resigns or is discharged, his employer must pay
earned wages within ten days or employee will be entitled to draw his
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regular salary until payment is made. Limit: sixty days or date suit is
initiated, whichever is earlier.
LOUISIANA: LA. REv. STAT. (1950) §§23-631; 23-632. Extends to virtually all
employees and allows penalty wages to accumulate indefinitely. (Indiana
has held a similar statute unconstitutional.) Applies when "employee dis-
charged or when he has resigned." Payment must be made within 24 hours
upon demand.
MAINE: ME. REv. STAT. (1944) §38, p. 556: "... but any employee leaving his
or her employment shall be paid in full on demand at the office of the
employer where pay rolls are kept and wages are paid . .. " Applies only
to public utility corporations or corporations engaged in mining or manu-
facturing. Maximum fine for violation: $50. See also §39, p. 556: (Con-
tract right to one week's advance notice).
MASSACHUSETTS: MASS. GEN. LAws (1951) ch. 149 §148: "An employee
leaving his employment shall be paid in full on the following regular pay
day, and in the absence of a regular pay day on the following Saturday
." (Modified for certification of pay rolls in city of Boston.) Penalty
for violation: Maximum fine of $50 or imprisonment for two months or
both. (Since 1951, above statute also includes farm laborers.)
See Ferry v. Kinsley Iron and Machine Co., 195 Mass. 548, 81 N.E. 305
(1907) (contract right to ten days' advance notice; wages forfeited);
Commonwealth v. Dunn, 170 Mass. 140, 48 N.E. 110 (1898). Wages must
be "due" at time of quitting for statute to apply. Complaint defective for
failure to so allege.
MICHIGAN: MICH. Comp. LAws §408.541. General coverage statute. Employee
quitting before pay day must be paid three days after demand. (Dis-
charged employee must be paid as soon as amount can be ascertained.)
MINNESOTA: MiNN. STAT. (1949) §181.13. Extends to most employees; re-
quires payment of earned wages to both discharged employees and em-
ployees quitting employment. Originally passed in 1919. Penalty for em-
ployer's violation: Accumulation of daily wages for a maximum of 15 days.
NEVADA: NEV. COMp. LAW: §2776. Broad coverage of employees. Employee
who quits must be paid earned wages within 24 hours after demand (dis-
charged employee to be paid immediately). Penalty: Fine of $300 to $500
and accumulation of additional daily wages for not more than 30 days.
NEW HAMPSHIRE: N.H. STAT. (1942) ch. 212, §20. If the employee quits
and "does not have a written contract for a definite period" he must be
paid earned wages on the next regular pay day. Penalty for violation:
Continuation of employee's wages at contract rate for a maximum of one
additional week after termination. (Discharged employee must be paid
within 72 hours if he works at employer's principal place of business.)
OREGON: ORE. CODE ANN. §102-607: "Where the employee not having a con-
tract for a definite period quits, all wages earned become payable not more
than three days after quitting." (Emphasis added.) (When discharged,
employee must be paid immediately upon discharge---except for seasonal
employment contracts.)
Carlson v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 118 Ore. 542,. 247 Pac. 804
(1926): The only instance in which a laborer cannot recover attorney's
fees in an action to collect wages not paid within 48 hours of demand is
where he voluntarily quits without giving three days' notice.
TEXAS: TEx. ComP. STAT. art. 5156. "Any employee leaving his or her em-
ployment, or discharged therefrom, shall be paid in full on six days de-
mand." Penalty: Maximum fine of $50 (art. 5157).
UTAH: UTAH CODE ANN. (1953) §34-10-1: When the employee not having a
contract for a definite period quits, then his earned wages are payable at
the next regular pay day. Penalty: Accumulation of additional daily wages
for a maximum of ten days. (Discharged employee must be paid imme-
mediately.)
WASHINGTON: WAsH. CoMBp. STAT. §49.48.010. "When any laborer perform-
ing work or labor ceases to work whether by discharge or by voluntary
withdrawal, the wages due must be paid forthizth. . ." (Emphasis added.)
1955]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Provisions of the statute cannot be contracted away: Burdette v. Broad-
view Dairy Co., 123 Wash. 158, 212 P. 181 (1923).
WISCONSIN: Wis. STAT. (1953) §103.39(1): ". . . any such employee, except
sales agents employed on a commission basis, not having a written con-
tract for a definite period who quits his employment shall be paid in full
upon three days demand, and any employee who is discharged shall be paid
in full within three days . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Penalty: §103.39(4): "Any person, firm or corporation violating the pro-
visions of this section, who having the ability to pay, shall fail to pay the
wages due and payable as herein provided, or shall falsely deny the amount
or validity thereof, or that the same is due, with intent to secure any dis-
count upon such indebtedness or with intent to annoy, harass, oppress, hinder
or defraud the person to whom such wages are due, shall be punished by a
fine of not less than twenty five dollars or more than one hundred dollars
or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than ten days nor more
than ninety days, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Each and every
failure or refusal to pay each employee the amount of wages due him at
the time, or under the conditions required in this section shall constitute a
separate offense. In addition to the criminal penalty herein provided,
every person, firm or corporation violating the provisions of this section
shall be liable for the payment of the following increased wages or salaries:
Ten per cent if the delay does not exceed three days; twenty per cent if
the delay is more than three days, but does not exceed ten days; thirty
per cent if the delay is more than ten days but does not exceed twenty
days; forty per cent if the delay is more than twenty days, but does not
exceed thirty days; fifty per cent if the delay is more than thirty days; but
in no event shall such increased wages or salaries exceed $50." (Emphasis
added.)
WYOMING: Wvo. ComP. STAT. (1945) §§54-604; 54-605: Covers most em-
ployees. Employee who quits must be paid earned wages within 72 hours
(discharged employee within 24 hours). Penalty: Maximum fine of $100.
NOTE: The following states by statute require payment of earned wages only
to the discharged employee and do not have provision as to employee who
quits his employment:
ARY. ANN. STAT. (1947) §81-308 (has specific statute refusing any payment
to employee quitting without just cause: §51-508): CAL. LABOR CODE §201
(See §202 re employee who quits his employment). IDAHO CODE ANN.
(1932) §44-606; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1949) §290.110; MONT. REv. CODE (1947)
§41-1301-1308; N. Max. STAT. (1941) §§57-302; 57-304; N.D. REv. CODE
(1943) .49.0823: R I1. CODE (1941) ch. 1069: (1942) ch. 1237: S. C. CODE
(1952) §40-117 (textiles), §40-118 (general) ; S. D. CODE (1939) §17.0405;
W. VA. CODE (1949) §2356.
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